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ABSTRACT 
The processes of regionalization and federalization are unquestionable trends in Europe 
considering the flow of powers from states to subnational levels. In multi-level systems, the 
patterns of regional and national careers have responded to this structural evolution. In the 
literature, two positions oppose each other about the effects of regionalism. Some authors argue 
that it does affect career patterns while other scholars found little evidence of the regionalism 
hypothesis. Unclear results in the literature are partly due to the limited number of comparative 
research across country and across time, choice in case selection, and bias of the unit of analysis. 
This paper seeks to address these three issues based on an original dataset of 4.991 regional and 
national careers in Belgium (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), Canada (Ontario and Quebec), 
Spain (Catalonia and Castilla-La-Mancha), and the UK (Wales and Scotland). The intranational 
and international comparison proves that regionalism does matter – regional politics attract 
more professionalized MPs where regionalism is stronger – but the national parliament remains 
ultimately the most attractive political arena across regions. 
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The processes of regionalization and federalization are unquestionable trends in Europe 
considering the flow of powers from states to subnational levels (Fitjar, 2010; Keating, 1998; 
Swenden, 2006). Formerly unitary states like France, the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, 
Belgium, and Spain have created regional tiers of government that enjoy large scope and depth 
of powers. In those countries, regionalism remain at the top of the political agenda and regions 
claim more autonomy, if not independence (e.g. Scotland and Catalonia). Besides, in 
established federations, where regions were installed with the creation of the federal state, 
processes of professionalization have taken place at the regional level (e.g. Germany and 
Austria). Overall, “the process of political decentralisation has elevated the standing of regional 
governments in the constitutional architecture of European states and represents one of the 
single most important transformations in the structuring of political authority” (Toubeau & 
Massetti, 2013). It is of course nothing peculiar to European political systems. The processes 
of institutionalization and professionalization of regional tiers of government have been studied 
in other Western democracies of Northern America and most particularly, the Canadian 
provincial legislatures and the U.S. State Legislatures (Atkinson & Docherty, 1992; Moncrief, 
1994, 1998, 1999; Squire, 1988). 
The patterns of regional and national careers have responded to this structural evolution. 
In the wake of those transformations, research on political careers on multi-level systems has 
significantly increased over the last 15 years, especially in newly regionalized European states 
(Fiers, 2001; Pilet, Fiers, & Steyvers, 2007; Stolz, 2001, 2003) (Botella, Teruel, Barbera, & 
Barrio, 2010; Real-Dato, Rodríguez-Teruel, & Jerez-Mir, 2011; Rodríguez-Teruel, 2011; 
Vanlangenakker, Maddens, & Put, 2013), but also in established federations, notably in 
Germany, Canada and the U.S. (Borchert & Stolz, 2011a; Docherty, 2011; Squire, 2014). 
Recent and innovative studies have permitted to renew research on career patterns. The time 
when the classic springboard model identified by (Schlesinger, 1966) – U.S. Congressmen use 
their State Legislature office where they first served as ‘springboard’ to the 
Congress – prevailed as the dominant framework for analysis is over. It has been showed that 
other career patterns exist – where regional politics prioritizes over national politics – and better 
explain political trajectories in multi-level systems (Stolz, 2003).  
Most efforts having been devoted to the identification and conceptualization of new 
career patterns, it is now necessary to assess more systematically and comparatively the factors 
causing distinct political paths. The road to office is complex – especially in multi-level 
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systems – and a comprehensive analysis of all aspects determining career patterns is beyond 
the scope of this study. This paper is specifically concerned with one but crucial determinant of 
career patterns, namely the strength of regionalism. While regionalism is at the source of the 
establishment of regional parliaments, its effects on political careers remain unclear. Two 
positions confront each other on the regionalism hypothesis. On the one hand, some authors 
argued that the stronger the regionalist cleavage, the more attractive the regional political arena 
for ambitions candidates (Botella et al., 2010; Stolz, 2001, 2003, 2010). On the other hand, 
other studies found that regionalism is a poor predictor of career patterns (Botella & Teruel, 
2010; Comeche-Pérez & Oñate, 2012; Vanlangenakker et al., 2013, p. 365). 
Despite the respective merits of previous studies, the uncertain effects of regionalism 
are related to limits in terms of data collection, cases selection and unit of analysis used. Firstly, 
the number of comparative analysis across regions and countries is still relatively limited in a 
field dominated by case studies (Patzelt, 1999). And when comparison across regions is 
performed, there are limitations across time: only a limited number of legislative terms are 
analysed. Secondly, there is a “selection bias” because regions studied are strong or extreme 
cases of regionalism (Geddes, 1990). The latter must nonetheless be compared with examples 
of weak regionalism in order to evaluate its effects on career patterns. Finally, findings are 
almost exclusively based on level-hopping movements between political arenas. As I developed 
in a recent article (Dodeigne, 2014), this unit of analysis does not however permit to evaluate 
the majority of political careers in a region or a country, namely individuals with careers at a 
single level of government (be it the regional or the national parliament). 
Therefore, this paper proposes an intranational and international comparative analysis 
of political careers in four multi-level Western democracies based on systematic examination 
of cases of strong regionalism (Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and Flanders) and cases of weak 
regionalism (Castilla-La-Mancha, Wales, Ontario, and Wallonia & Brussels). The regionalism 
hypothesis is tested on an original dataset of 4.991 careers regional and national political 
parliamentary careers. The findings confirm that regionalism does matter – regional politics 
attract more professionalized MPs where regionalism is stronger – but the national parliament 
remains ultimately the most attractive political arena across regions 
The paper proceeds in three parts. Firstly, I introduce the concept of regionalism and 
discuss the two positions found in the literature about its impact on career patterns in multi-
level systems. Secondly, in the methodology section I develop the comparative research design, 
the importance of the unit of analysis as well as issues in data collection and data analysis. 
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Thirdly, I present the results and then discuss the implication of the findings for regional and 
federal studies. 
The Regionalism Hypothesis 
A paper analysing the impact of regionalism cannot bypass the issue of conceptualization. 
According to (Swenden, 2006, p. 14): “[r]egionalism refers to a process which leads territorial 
subunits within or across existing sovereign states to increase their influence. That process may 
have a socioeconomic, political or cultural driving force or may be a combination of all these 
factors. As such regionalism is in part a bottom-up process, but the consent of the centre is 
needed to increase the levels of regional autonomy”. Regionalism is therefore a process that 
“have a socioeconomic, political or cultural driving force or may be a combination of all these 
factors” (my italic). Because it entails political and cultural driving forces, multi-level identity 
(in terms of regional and national self-identification) as well as ethnoregionalist parties are 
typical objects of inquiry for students of regional and federal studies. They are part of the core 
cultural and political expressions of regionalism – albeit not the only ones.  
One the hand, a strong regional self-identification associated with a weak self-
identification with the national state is more likely to transform into strong regionalism. On the 
other hand, ethnoregionalist parties are central in the political expression of regionalism. In the 
bottom-up process described by Swenden, regional/national self-identification alone is indeed 
not enough to develop into strong/weak regionalism. It requires that political actors construct 
and articulate this regional sense of belonging into a regional political project. It furthermore 
requires political actors to convey regional claims of self-rule at the national level. Besides, not 
only do political actors relay regional demands of autonomy to the central government (bottom-
up process), but regional political elites also try and develop a regionalist/nationalist building-
process through an active promotion of regional identities (top-down process) (Maddens, 
Beerten, & Billiet, 1998; Martínez-Herrera, 2002; Miley, 2006; Luis Moreno, 2001; Rocher, 
2002; Torcal & Mota, 2013).  
A direct effect of regionalism on career patterns is of course the development of new 
career opportunities with the establishment of regional institutions. Newly created regional 
positions offered additional career prospects for incumbent national MPs, but it also opened 
new roads to office for a whole generation of aspirants who did not have hitherto access to 
parliamentary positions. But beyond new opportunities at the first regional elections, how 
regionalism does impact career patterns over time? Any students of legislative recruitment 
cannot bypass the seminal model of the classic springboard that was identified and theorized 
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by (Schlesinger, 1966). In this model, where rational ambitious candidates seek to obtain the 
highest positions in the political systems, U.S. Congressmen use their State Legislature office 
as a ‘springboard’ to the Congress. Although this so-called ‘ladder model’ has long served as 
the dominant framework for analysis, it proved to be of little use once exported to other political 
systems. In particular in multi-level systems where regional political arenas represent more than 
a mere stepping stone towards national offices, i.e. where regionalism is stronger than in the 
mononational U.S. federation. 
(Stolz, 2003) identified four career patterns that better explain political trajectories in 
multi-level systems. First of all, regional offices can be prioritized over national offices in the 
“inverse springboard model” (e.g. Brazil) (Samuels, 2003). Secondly, regional and national 
arenas can be equally attractive inducing movements in both directions in highly integrated 
political systems (e.g. Belgium and Spain) (Fiers, 2001; Stolz, 2010; Vanlangenakker et al., 
2013)(Dodeigne, 2014). On the opposite, regional and national political arenas have their own 
dynamics and are ‘compartmentalized’, i.e. level-hopping movements are quasi absent pattern 
(e.g. Canada and the United Kingdom) (Docherty, 2011; Stolz, 2010)(Dodeigne, 2014). In 
previous studies, most efforts have been devoted to the identification and conceptualization of 
career patterns, but the effects of regionalism remain unclear. 
 Two position oppose each other in the literature. On the one hand, some scholars have 
argued that regionalism directly influence the emergence of career patterns. On the other hand, 
other authors have found that regionalism is a poor predictor of career patterns. The first 
position is defended by (Stolz, 2001, p. 90) who hypothesised that “[t]he existence of a regional 
identity, a regional culture and a regional public arena often constitute incentives for staying in 
regional politics”. He defends that, under the condition that regionalism spouses a process of 
professionalization of regional politics, regionalism matters for political careers: “two of the 
most important factors that strengthen the attractiveness of regional parliaments vis-a-vis 
national parliaments are the existence of a strong regional identity (expressed in an active 
regionalist cleavage) and high levels of professionalization. Without a regional identity, 
politicians’ motivation to live for politics tends to be dominated by a national perspective” 
(Stolz, 2003, p. 243). In his comparative work that includes an extensive number of regions 
from traditional and new federal systems, he found that the Basque country, Galicia, Flanders, 
Quebec, some northern Italian and eastern German regions present lower movements of 
regional deputies towards the national parliament (Stolz, 2003, p. 243). 
In a more recent analysis of Catalonia and Scotland, (Stolz, 2010) also showed that 
regionalism create stronger regional career orientations, although career patterns shape 
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differently (i.e. “alternative pattern” in Scotland and “integrated pattern” in Catalonia). In his 
in-depth analysis of Brazil, (Samuels, 2003) also demonstrated that most national politicians 
are not nationally-oriented but regionally-oriented. In another comparative study of France, 
Spain and the UK, (Botella et al., 2010) also produced interesting findings that tend to validate 
the regionalism hypothesis. They argued that regional institutions have generated their own and 
specific values leading to the development of a regional cursus honorum (Botella et al., 2010, 
p. 57). Yet, they focused on regional prime ministers and, therefore, their conclusions have to 
be put into perspective because the road to government is not as similar as the road to 
parliament. 
 On the opposite, other scholars have argued that regionalism is a poor predictor of career 
patterns. (Vanlangenakker et al., 2013, p. 365) who analysed Flanders and Wallonia clearly 
refuted the regionalism hypothesis. “In Belgium, regionalism is undeniably stronger in Flanders 
than in Wallonia. Yet, it is the Walloon Parliament that consistently appears the more attractive 
one […] The authors are at a loss to ﬁnd an explanation for this difference. [Therefore] 
regionalism, in terms of the sense of regional identity and the strength of regionalist parties, 
appears to be a poor predictor of the career patterns”. In their study of the political careers of 
national and regional Spanish MPs, (Comeche-Pérez & Oñate, 2012) also tested the regionalism 
hypothesis based on career movements between the regional and national political arenas, as 
well as to the degree of self-identification to the Spanish state and the Comunidades Autónomas. 
They concluded that “MPs develop different careers paths, but without clear-cut regional 
peculiarities” (Comeche-Pérez & Oñate, 2012, p. 10). Finnaly, (Botella & Teruel, 2010, p. 22) 
found counter-intuitive that the Spanish regional premiers who develop the stronger regional 
career orientation are politicians from state-wide political parties (PSOE and PP) and originate 
from Comunidades Autónomas where regionalism is weaker.  
In conclusion, the literature is clearly divided on the regionalism hypothesis. Despite 
the respective merits of existing studies, inconclusive results are partly due to research limits 
regarding (1) the comparative design across regions and across time, (2) cases selection, and 
(3) the unit of analysis. I thus aim at moving the debate forward by addressing these three issues. 
First of all, the field remains largely devoted to case study analysis (Patzelt, 1999, p. 241). 
Besides, even when studies are comparative in nature, this is the time scope that tends to be 
limited. For instance, Stolz (2003)’s research is highly comparative across countries (an 
extensive dataset that gathers most federal political systems in the world) but his analysis 
focuses on a single legislative term. As acknowledged by the author himself, this might induce 
a temporal bias and alter the robustness of the findings (e.g. exceptional or poor electoral 
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performance directly affects the composition of the legislative term under scrutiny). The in-
depth analysis of particular cases excludes this temporal bias but another kind of limitation 
emerges, namely a selection bias (Geddes, 1990). Most case studies are based on strong or 
extreme cases of regionalism1. Assessing the effects of regionalism requires however to analyse 
regions where regionalism varies and, in particular, a comparison with cases of weak 
regionalism). Finally, level-hopping movements – e.g. regional MPs moving up to take a seat 
at the national parliament, and vice-and versa – remain by far the main unit of analysis used to 
label career patterns. In a recent article, I nonetheless demonstrated the methodological 
problems of this choice (Dodeigne, 2014). Among other reasons, I showed that level-hopping 
movements overlook the vast majority of regional and national MPs who develop 
professionalized careers at a single level of government. This paper seeks to address those three 
issues through the adoption of a comparative research design developed in the following 
section. 
Research design 
Comparative research design 
Testing the regionalism hypothesis requires a comparative research design encompassing 
distinct countries and where, ‘all other things being equal’, the strength of regionalism varies 
across regions. Maintaining ‘all other things equal’ except the variance of regionalism is yet a 
very complicated task. In that case, intranational comparison constitutes a strategic research 
solution. As wisely wrote by (Lijphart, 1971, p. 689) in the early 1970s, “comparative 
intranational analysis can take advantage of the many similar national characteristics serving as 
controls”. Selecting cases of weak and strong regionalism within countries, the regionalism 
hypothesis is tested while the effects of other intervening variables are limited thanks to 
intranational comparison. It is the same national political system with its own political culture, 
and above all, candidates from all regions compete under (quasi-)identical national electoral 
rules. Furthermore, the selection of regions across various countries increases the power of 
generalization of the findings. In other words, the intranational and international comparison 
permits to reduce two limits previously mentioned, namely that prior findings are primarily 
based on case studies and that selection bias overlooks cases of weak regionalism.  
In today’s world, where all democratic states have a certain degree of decentralization, 
it is common to read that we live in a world of ‘multi-level governance’. This study is yet more 
                                                 
1 Although most authors have valid methodological reasons according to their own research agenda. 
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specifically concerned with multi-level systems where there is a regional tier of government 
between the decentralized local level and the national government, excluding mere 
decentralized local bodies. (Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel, 2008, p. 113)’s dataset of 42 
democracies over the world has the advantage to not only identify those regional bodies, but 
also to attribute them a score on the regional authority index (RAI). The population of cases is 
yet reduced to countries where regional assemblies are directly elected assemblies (e.g. it 
excludes Trentino-Alto Adige-Südtirol in Italy) and where candidates are elected under 
democratic rules (e.g. it excludes the Russian federation where corruption arguably alter the 
electoral process). In order to assess the impact of regionalism ‘all other things being equal’, I 
furthermore rule out cases with low degree of regional authority and low level of 
professionalization of regional politics (e.g. Todofuken in Japan and Fylker in Finland). Finally, 
to compare cases of strong and weak regionalism, I select countries where regionalism itself is 
at stake. It thus excludes countries where there are limited demands for regional autonomy. For 
instance, in Italy a referendum for extended regionalization (Devoluzione) was rejected in 2005 
by a large majority of two thirds of the voters (Keating & Wilson, 2010, p. 13). Likewise, 
despite its constitutional decentralized features, the German federation has in practice social 
demands for state-wide policies while it presents limited claims for increased regional 
autonomy (Erk, 2008). Similarly, the Swiss and the U.S. federations are often presented as good 
examples of mononational federalism (Béland & Lecours, 2008; Dardanelli, 2007).  
Hence, the case selection is reduced to four multi-level democracies: Canada, Belgium, 
Spain, and the UK. In addition to the methodological reasons described above, they have the 
advantage of being Western political systems. It also gathers a manageable number of regions 
that can be analysed in-depth. In sum, the research design produces a trade-off between scope 
and depth of analysis. The selection of regions within these countries is proceeded according to 
two main criteria in line with the definition of regionalism, namely the strength of 
ethnoregionalist parties as well as multi-level identities.  
For the regions of strong regionalism, the choice is relatively straightforward: Catalonia 
(Spain), Flanders (Belgium), Quebec (Canada), and Scotland (the UK). In those four regions, 
ethnoregionalist parties are strong political parties – if not the strongest – even though their 
electoral success might have evolved over time and across regional and federal elections 
(Lieven De Winter, Gómez-Reino, & Lynch, 2006; L. De Winter & Türsan, 1998; Hepburn, 
2010). Moreover, citizens’ self-identification with their region is more important in cases of 
strong regionalism than in any other regions of the country (Deschouwer & Sinardet, 2010; 
Frognier, De Winter, & Baudewyns, 2008; Henderson, 2005; Lachapelle, 2007; Luis  Moreno, 
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2006). Last but not least, the fact that three of the four regions (Quebec, Catalonia, and 
Scotland) have or are going to organize referenda on independence is surely the best illustration 
of the strength of regionalism (see table 1)2. In contrast, in Castilla-La-Mancha (Spain), 
Wallonia & Brussels (Belgium), Ontario (Canada), and Wales (the UK) are cases of weak 
regionalism. I decided to include Brussels (the last of three Belgians regions) because of the 
common candidatures of Walloon and Flemish MPs at Brussels elections. Furthermore, it 
permits to present a complete picture of all Belgian regional parliaments. 
In cases of weak regionalism, ethnoregionalist parties have no representation in regional 
nor national parliaments (Magone, 2009, p. 230; Van Haute & Pilet, 2006; Wiseman, 1997). 
There is however the notorious exception of Wales (Plaid Cymru) and Brussels (FDF). The 
FDF (Federation of the Democrat French-speaking) is yet a party primarily based on the defence 
on the French-speakers in the (Flemish) surroundings of Brussels and not a party promoting 
independence for Brussels. In the UK, the Welsh ethnoregionalist party (Plaid Cymru) is an 
ethnoregionalist party that advocates an independent Wales but it constitutes nonetheless a case 
of weak(er) regionalism. The Plaid Cymru have significantly poorer electoral results than its 
Scottish counterpart (the Scottish National Party), but it also ranks second or third far behind 
the first Welsh party (Labour). Last but not least, Plaid Cymru’s explicit commitment to 
independence is a recent evolution (at the 2011 party conference): the party used to promote 
the idea of ‘self-government’ during decades instead of pure and simple independence 
(Christiansen, 1998, pp. 130-132). Regarding the second criterion – regional/national 
identities – a clear distinction emerges between two types of regionalism. Studies have 
demonstrated that in cases of weak regionalism, citizens self-identify more frequently and more 
intensively with the national state than their own region, and vice-and versa in cases of strong 
regionalism (Cameron & Simeon, 1997; Deschouwer & Sinardet, 2010; Drummond, 1987; 
Frognier et al., 2008; Luis Moreno, Arriba, & Serrano, 1998). Although Welsh self-identify 
much more with Wales than all other regions of weak regionalism, it is once again not as 
developed as in the case of Scotland proving than Wales is a case of weaker regionalism in the 
UK (Curtice, 2013). 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                                 
2 In Catalonia, the reality of the organization of a referendum is yet debatable in absence of agreement between 
the Catalonian and Spanish governments. 
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Despite my efforts to gather similar regions, intranational differences remain inevitable. 
Because regionalism is precisely more developed in some regions than others, regions like 
Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec and Scotland have always tried and obtained specific institutional 
demands leading to asymmetrical federalism (McGarry, 2005; Zuber, 2011). For instance, 
Catalonia – like other Spanish historical nations – followed a fast-track route for the 
implementation of its regional institutions enjoying greater power (based on the art. 151 of the 
Spanish Constitution) whereas Castilla-La-Mancha was granted autonomy on a slow route 
process with lower authority (art. 143)(Magone, 2009, pp. 194-195). In Belgium, Flanders 
merged its Community and Regional institutions into the mere Flemish Parliament whereas 
Brussels and Wallonia share a common Community institution apart from their regional 
parliaments. In the UK, the denomination of the “Scottish Parliament” is not random but 
reflects its greater authority in comparison of the “National Assembly for Wales”. In Canada, 
Quebec has developed its own judicial system, disposes of a wider scope of fiscal capacity and 
can carry out its own policies in pension and immigration area for instance (Burgess, 2006). 
Although the scope of and depth of authority may vary across “sister region”, it does not lead 
to notorious unbalanced powers. And above all selecting regions from common national 
political system limits in a better way the inevitable institutional divergences. The regions are 
therefore to be considered as “relatively similar” political systems (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990, pp. 
132-133), expect for the strength of regionalism. Let us now turn to the final element that 
deserves a special attention to test the regionalism hypothesis, namely the unit of analysis. 
Unit of analysis 
By using level-hopping movements as the unit of analysis, most research 
investigates – explicitly or implicitly – the links between national and regional political arenas 
(Borchert & Stolz, 2011b, p. 111). However, this approach provides little information about the 
dynamics within political arenas. Based on an individual and longitudinal perspective, where 
the unit of analysis is the individual political careers per se, I proposed in a recent article a new 
typology of career patterns. It is based on a matrix that accounts for duration of political careers 
at the regional and national levels (Dodeigne, 2014). The matrix distinguishes hence four ideal-
types of career pattern in multi-levels systems: the national career pattern, the regional career 
pattern, the multi-level career pattern and the discrete career pattern.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
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The national career and regional career patterns are self-explicit: they are formed of MPs 
who served respectively in the national and the regional parliament. They started their career at 
the national and regional parliaments and never moved to another tier of government. The 
discrete pattern is also formed of regional and national MPs who conducted a career at a single 
level of government but who were in office for a (very) short amount of time. Contrary to the 
regional and national patterns that are formed of professionalized parliamentarians, MPs with 
discrete careers are ‘amateurs’ or ‘citizens-politicians’. The threshold adopted to distinguish 
discrete careers with professionalized careers is that MPs served (at least) two complete 
legislative terms. It represents a political experience of about a decade in most advanced 
democracies. The two legislative terms was adopted because it is similar to the rules fixed by 
political parties that seek to ensure the rotation of offices to restrict the professionalization of 
politics (see for instance the Green parties in Europe, Burchell, 2001). Finally, the multi-level 
pattern represents a particular group of MPs as they are the only ones who acquire political 
experience at both levels of government. 
Hypotheses 
Based on the above classification, two kinds of results are expected in terms of intra-regional 
and inter-regional differences. On the one hand, if regionalism matters for career patterns, level-
hopping movements should be more important from regional towards national level in cases of 
weak regionalism, and vice-and-versa in cases of strong regionalism.  
H 1a. Weak regionalism: Level-hopping movements towards national  towards regional level 
H 1b. Strong regionalism: Level-hopping movements towards national  towards regional level 
 Secondly, where regionalism is stronger (Flanders, Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec), it 
is expected that regional politics prioritized over national politics in these regions. Not only the 
regional career pattern should be more important than the national career pattern, but regional 
discrete careers are expected to be fewer than national discrete careers. Where regionalism is 
weaker (Wallonia and Brussels, Wales, Castilla-La-Mancha and Ontario), the opposite is 
expected. Yet, assessing differences between regional and national patterns makes little sense 
without integrating the availability of positions at the two political arenas. Although the 
difference of national and regional offices is relatively short in some cases (in Wallonia, 
Flanders, and Castilla-Mancha, the ratio of national/regional seats available is below 20 
percent) or even null (Ontario), the gap is much greater in all other regions analysed (from 33.3 
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percent until 77.5 percent)3. In other words, the emergence of career patterns must be evaluated 
in light of the relative availibity of seats at the each level of government. For that reason, I 
propose to use two ratios based on the four career patterns presented below:  
(1) Regional ratio = Regional careers/Discrete regional careers 
(2) National ratio = National careers/Discrete national careers 
The higher the ratios, the greater the professionalization of regional and national politics. 
On the opposite, the lower the ratios, the grater the development of ‘citizens-politicians’ at 
national and regional levels. If regionalism matters, the regional ratio is expected to be higher 
than the national ratio when regionalism is stronger. Indeed, regional politics should prioritize 
over national politics and the regional parliament should attract the most ambitious candidates 
conducting lengthy careers at the expense of the national parliament. 
H 2a. Weak regionalism: National ratio  Regional ratio 
H 2b. Strong regionalism: Regional ratio  National ratio 
Because regionalism is primarily promoted by ethnoregionalist parties, there are good 
reasons to believe that, ceteris paribus, candidates from those parties are more likely to conduct 
regional careers instead of national careers. Regional politics is the raison d’être of these parties 
and the “administration of powers and resources allocated to ‘their’ region for its wellbeing and 
in its exclusive interest” is one of the two missions of regionalist parties according to (Massetti 
& Schakel, 2013, p. 801). The other mission is that “these parties aim to exert pressure on the 
state in order to extract transfers of powers from the centre to the periphery”. Yet, I argue that 
even though this role ‘national’ mission was paramount before devolution, its function has 
decreased after the establishment of regional parliaments. As it is observed in many regions, 
media attention has switch to the regional level while the decision to organize referendum on 
independence is sometimes taken without the national government agreement (Catalonia). It 
follows that: 
H 3. Ethnoregionalist candidates: regional career pattern  national career 
 For the third hypothesis, it is important to keep in mind that I look at individual careers. 
It is expected that candidates have distinct career patterns according to party line but it is not to 
say that ethnoregionalist and state-wide political parties refrain from winning national and 
regional elections. 
                                                 




Data is collected for all candidates who were once elected in regional and/or national 
assemblies. Although the paper is primarily about parliamentary careers, I do take into account 
government positions as it is common to observe regional MPs called into national government 
(and vice-and-versa) in Belgium and Spain4. At the national parliament, I also recorded offices 
in the upper house but only for directly elected senators. The starting point for data collection 
is the last national elections before the establishment of regional parliaments. For Quebec and 
Ontario, where federal and provincial assemblies were created in 1867, the time scale is 
however reduced to the early 1990s. The 1993 federal elections were selected because they 
constitute a rupture in Canadian political life: “[n]ational parties, national politics, and national 
electoral competition no longer existed in a Canada that was deeply divided and regionally 
fragmented” (Carty, Cross, & Young, 2000, p. 14). Furthermore, the selection of the 1993 
elections makes sense from the viewpoint of parliamentary renewal. The score for the 
(Pedersen, 1979) index, which assesses the net change of seats between political parties, is 
exceptionally high in 1993 in Quebec and Ontario (respectively, 62 and 62.5) while it drops to 
sores between 2.0 and 28.5 afterwards5.  
Overall, 4.991 careers are coded for Spain (1.530), Belgium (1.685), Canada (1.237), 
and the UK (539)6. Duration of political careers are recorded in number of positions but more 
importantly according to the real duration in office (in number of months). Indeed, changes 
during session are very frequent creating very short careers that the number of offices cannot 
accurately describe. The sources used are official electoral results and parliamentary acts for 
changes during legislative terms. Most sources are now available online even though archives 
from Parliament libraries as well as national and regional administrations are necessary before 
the mid-1990s in Spain and Belgium. Data collection was processed until April 2014 (Quebec), 
May 2014 (Scotland and Wales), July 2014 (Ontario) and August 2014 (all regions in Belgium 
and Spain). It thus takes into account the latest elections organized. Although I focus on regional 
and national careers, the analysis takes into account level-hopping movements from and 
towards the European level. In other words, I make sure that regional and national careers have 
                                                 
4 It contrasts with Westminster-style parliamentary systems – the UK and Canada in this study – where ministers 
are selected among parliamentary ranks. 
5 It rises again up to 57.0 in Quebec after the 2011 federal elections (but not in Ontario). Source: author’s own 
calculation for Ontario and (Dodeigne, 2014) for Quebec. 
6 It also includes MPs who were once elected in a region other the nine scrutinized in this paper. This type of 
profiles remains however very rare accounting for less than 0.5 percent of all careers analyzed. 
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no interaction with the European Parliament. For the latter, I use the (Høyland, Sircar, & Hix, 
2009)’s database which I updated from November 2011 until July 2014.  
All careers are classified according to the four career patterns before mentioned. An 
extra category is yet created due to ‘censored data’. It covers newly elected MPs with no prior 
parliamentary/government experience who cannot be classified into existing categories at the 
moment. Besides, the category ‘others’ regroups European political careers as well as the 
generation of MPs who served in the national parliament until the establishment of regional 
parliaments but who were not re-elected subsequently (at any levels). It was nevertheless 
necessary to record them in order to calculate the ratio of national level-hoppers at the first 
regional elections (see below). A final issue concerns error management. Limiting – if not 
excluding – errors during data collection is a paramount goal of scientific research, it is 
nevertheless particularly challenging when dealing with individuals who have names with 
distinct spellings, accents, inclusion of second names, initials, etc. over time and across levels. 
A usal example of this is Las Cortes de Castilla-La-Mancha recording this female MPs as 
“Ayuso González, María del Pilar” while the European parliament presents her as “Pilar 
Ayuso” without accents, inversing names, and excluding second first names and forenames. 
Therefore, I use an algorithm based on the Levenshtein distance which is a “measure of the 
number of edit operations that must performed to transform one string to the other. An edit 
operation includes character insertion, delete, and substitution” (Cesare & Xiang, 2012, p. 64). 
In other words, the Levenshtein distance identifies plausible correspondences between several 
names of candidates. Although the researcher’s intervention remains indispensable – all 
matches must be checked and validated one by one – it reduces significantly the risk of errors 
when working on thousands of careers. 
Findings 
The empirical results presented in this section are based on descriptive statistics. The dataset 
being inclusive of all individual careers (it is not a sample)7, all differences detected are indeed 
significant per se of the variance observed in the nine regions. First of all, the data confirms 
previous studies that Spain and Belgium (in all regions examined) present integrated political 
arenas in view of the large percentage of regional and national MPs with multi-level experience 
(see table 2). By contrast, parliamentarians in the UK and Canada evolve in regional and 
national political arenas (quasi-)closed to each other. Even though Scotland has a percentage of 
                                                 
7 Even in the case of Canada, all careers are recorded for the period under investigation. 
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multi-level careers alike Catalonia and Castilla-La-Mancha, most of them are due to level-
hopping movements at the first Scottish election in 1999. After the first 1999-2003 legislature, 
level-hoppers constitute clearly an exception, not the rule. Secondly, the UK is the political 
system where the professionalization of regional and national politics is the most developed. 
The percentage of discrete careers is particularly low accounting for a clear minority of regional 
and national MPs in Wales (18.3) and Scotland (19.2 percent) whereas it forms the quasi 
majority of political careers in Castilla-La-Mancha (56.5 percent), Catalonia (48.3 percent), and 
to a lesser extent in Brussels (40.4), Quebec (39.3 percent), Flanders (37.8), Ontario (33.9), and 
Wallonia (25.0). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Thirdly, the conceptual classification between professionalized politicians with long and 
established careers (regional and national career patterns) and ‘citizens-politicians’ with short-
term political experience (discrete regional and discrete national career patterns) emerged very 
distinctly (table 3). MPs with discrete careers are hardly in office for a complete legislature, be 
it at the regional or the national level. On average, they are in office for 1.0 to 1.5 offices (about 
40 months of service) in the nine regions. On the opposite, regional and national careers reflect 
established and professionalized politicians: they serve during three to four mandates with an 
average duration of 10 to 14 years, except in the UK where they stay much longer, i.e. 16 
(Wales) to 18 years (Scotland). 
[Table 3 about here] 
Based on this data, I now present in details the results for the three hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis tests whether or not strong regionalism induces more often level-hopping in the 
direction of the national level, and vice-and-versa in the case of weak regionalism. Table 4 
describes hence three kinds of movements: the frequency of movements towards the regional 
political arena (Nat→Reg), towards the national political arena (Reg→Nat), and MPs who 
moved back and forth between both levels (integrated). The first clear result is that regional 
MPs move indeed more often towards national parliaments in cases of weak regionalism than 
in cases of strong regionalism. The percentages of ‘Reg→Nat movements’ are systematically 
higher in Castilla-La-Mancha, Wales, Wallonia and Brussels in comparison to their ‘sister’ 
region. The results are enhanced by the fact that the national parliaments offer less positions 
than the regional assemblies and, therefore, accessibility and availability of national positions 
are restricted.  
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Yet, the effects of regionalism are not as conclusive as expected. On the one hand, 
Quebec presents more MPs conducting movements towards the national than the regional level. 
On the other hand, although the ‘Reg→Nat movements’ are higher in Wales, Wallonia and 
Brussels (in comparison to their sister region), there are ultimately more ‘Nat→Reg 
movements’ in those regions contrary to the previsions of hypothesis 1. Furthermore, in 
Belgium, the high ratio of integrated career even shows that both the regional and national 
levels appear equally attractive (22.4 percent in Flanders, 25.8 percent in Wallonia and up to 
53.1 percent in Brussels). Overall, only Spain constitutes a paramount example of the 
regionalism hypothesis. In Catalonia (strong regionalism), national MPs who try and manage 
to take up a seat at the Parlament de Catalunya form the most important group (n=54, 47.8 
percent) whereas in Castilla-La-Mancha (weak regionalism), there are more regional MPs who 
first served in Las Cortes de Castilla-La-Mancha before moving to the Congreso and the 
Senado (n=32, 56.1 percent).  
[Table 4 about here] 
Level-hopping movements in table 4 are yet slightly biased by the high percentage of 
centrifugal movements at first regional elections. At a time when regional parliaments where 
newly established institutions full of vacant seats to be populated, national incumbents 
successfully run at first regional elections creating an unusual ratio of ‘Nat→Reg movements’. 
They account for 20.8 percent in Scotland, 24.6 percent in Catalonia, and 44.6 percent in 
Wallonia. In line with previous research, it is therefore worth distinguishing level-hopping 
movements with and without first regional legislatures. 
Controlling for the latter, movements in Scotland and Wales now corroborate the 
regionalism hypothesis (see table 5): transfers towards London are more frequent in Wales (66.7 
percent) whereas Scottish MPs leave more frequently their national position to serve at 
Holyrood, the seat of the Scottish Parliament (66.7 percent). In Belgium, the regionalism 
hypothesis is also perfectly verified in Flanders, but contrary to our expectations, ‘Reg→Nat 
movements’ still constitute the smallest groups of level-hoppers in Wallonia (40.2 percent) and 
Brussels (27.4 percent). The problem with level-hopping movements is that they strongly 
depend upon electoral rules (e.g. possibility of dual offices in Scotland and Wales whereas 
provincial Quebecker MPs must resign before running for federal elections) whilst they often 
reflect party strategy – especially in PR systems (Borchert, 2011, p. 126) – rather than regional 
and national individual ambition. Moreover, although Scottish and Welsh movements are in 
line with the excepted results, the very low amount of transfers – respectively, 12 and 9 
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movements accounting for hardly 4.3 and 6.6 of the careers analysed – strongly limits the 
production of robust results (e.g. a couple of movements at the next election may 
counterbalance the current picture). Analysing regional and national careers is thus the second 
necessary step to assess the regionalism hypothesis. 
[Table 5 about here] 
In the second hypothesis, it is expected that the regional ratio will be higher than the 
national ratio when regionalism is stronger. Interestingly, it is however the national parliament 
that continues to attract the most professionalized MPs across all regions, irrespective of the 
strength of regionalism (see table 6). In the UK, the ratio is particularly high which implies that 
once a national candidate manage to enter the parliament, he/she is almost secured to stay for 
an extensive period of time (4 legislative terms on average). The unique exception is Brussels 
where the regional ratio (0.9) slightly exceeds the national ratio (0.8). In that region, seats 
availability probably explain why regional politics predominates, albeit marginally. With a 
population of hardly 1 million inhabitants, the Brussel-Capital regions Parliament disposes of 
89 regional seats (but only 20 national seats) whereas the 6 million Flemish are represented by 
124 regional and 102 national MPs and the 4 million Walloons elect 75 regional and 61 national 
MPs. In all regions examined, it is thus not surprising that the proportion of regional/national 
seats is the highest in Brussels (77.5 percent). 
[Table 6 about here] 
Nevertheless, the fact that the national state prevails as the main attractive political 
centre does not exclude any regionalism effects. Firstly, national ratios are systematically higher 
in cases of weak regionalism than in cases of strong regionalism. The difference is particularly 
spectacular in the UK (the national ratio equals 20.5 in Wales but is only of 11.83 in Scotland) 
but is also substantial in Canada (it is of 3.12 in Ontario and 1.56 in Quebec) and to a lesser 
extent in Belgium and Spain (the variance is about 20-30 percent). Secondly, despite the 
predominance of the national parliament, regional ratios tend to be very similar if not equal to 
the national ratio in cases of strong regionalism. For instance, the national ratios in Ontario and 
Wallonia are twice as big as the regional ratios whereas the gap between ratios significantly 
drops in cases of strong regionalism (e.g. regional and national ratios are respectively of 1.37 
and 1.56 in Quebec and of 0.72 and 0.99 in Flanders). And even though Scotland presents a 




The final hypothesis examines intra-case variance and in particular whether differences 
observed result from specific political parties. As presented in table 7, there are clearly 
divergent political behaviours between political careers from ethnoregionalist parties and the 
others. On the one hand, candidates from ethnoregionalist parties develop more often regional 
careers (the regional ratio is higher than the national ratio) while other candidates have a higher 
national ratio. The only exception is in the UK (both Scotland and Wales) where Westminster 
attracts professional MPs irrespective of the kind of political parties. Yet, in that two cases, 
findings must be considered very cautiously due to small number of observations of ethno-
regionalist candidates with a national career pattern: there are 6 SNP and 6 Plaid Cymru national 
careers. On the other, hand, candidates from all other parties present a larger national ratio 
although they did not defect regional parliaments considering that the regional ratio is not that 
dissimilar to their ethnoregionalist counterpart (Flanders and Scotland). In Catalonia and 
Quebec, political behaviours diverge nonetheless more importantly creating a dual picture 
between the two types of candidates. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Conclusion 
Career patterns are diversified in multi-level systems. Previous research has shown that regional 
politics has become another attractive centre of politics, if not the most important political 
arena. While the strength of regionalism is at the basis of the establishment of regional 
parliaments, its effects remain unclear in the literature. Some authors argue that it does affect 
career patterns while other scholars found little evidence of the regionalism hypothesis. 
Inconclusive results in the literature are partly due to the limited number of comparative 
research across country and across time, case selection bias (cases of weak regionalism are 
overlooked), and choice of the unit of analysis (most studies are based on the mere level-
hopping movements and not on regional and national careers). In the wake of previous studies, 
this paper aimed at moving forward the debate on the regionalism hypothesis based on an 
intranational and international comparative research that integrates cases of strong regionalism 
(Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and Flanders) and cases of weak regionalism (Castilla-La-
Mancha, Ontario, Wales, Wallonia and Brussels). The analysis of 4.991 regional and national 
careers in those nine led to the conclusion that regionalism does matter but nationalism prevails. 
In terms of level-hopping movements, there are generally more national MPs moving to 
regional institutions in cases of strong regionalism and more regional MPs moving up to 
national political arena in cases of weaker regionalism. While Catalonia and Castilla-La-
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Mancha could be used as ‘handbook ‘examples of the effects of strong and weak regionalism 
on level-hoppers, results from the other regions are yet not that compelling or even 
contradicting the expected results. Based on political careers conducted at a single level of 
government (which form the overwhelming majority of careers identified), findings are much 
more convincing. In all cases of strong regionalism, there are more candidates developing 
regional professionalized careers than in cases of weak regionalism. This is particularly the case 
for members of ethnoregionalist parties who present more regional careers than national 
careers. Although regionalism does matter, overall the national parliament remains nonetheless 
the most attractive institution across all regions (except in Brussels for particular reasons due 
to the seats availability). For students of regional and national studies, the results are highly 
relevant. More than any formal description of powers, career patterns are indeed considered as 
key proxy of the genuine balance of powers between regional and national arenas (Squire, 
2014). It proves that regionalism, in terms of regional identity and strength of ethno-regional 
parties, has indeed shaped career patterns in favour of the regional political arena but that the 
national state has nonetheless retained its central and dominant position.  
This conclusion as yet to be put into perspective on three aspects. First of all, the findings 
regarding the professionalization of regional and national political arenas should not be 
overestimated because only parliamentary/government offices were analysed. Indeed, office 
professionalization must be distinguished from individual professionalization. A parliamentary 
office might appear at first glance little professionalized but individuals holding these offices 
might be on the contrary professionalized politicians (at the party level, municipal level, 
administration level, etc.). Although the distinction tends to be less pertinent in the case of 
Canada and the UK, where parliamentary and government offices constitutes the highest 
positions of the political systems, the distinction is worthwhile in Spain and Belgium. In other 
words, they are often “amateur legislators but professionalized politicians” (Jones, 2002). 
Secondly, future analysis should assess whether this national dominance has been 
constant or has evolved over time in the nine regions examined, a goal beyond the scope of this 
actual study though. Finally, in this paper, effects of regionalism were analysed at an aggregate 
level and across regions and countries. Yet, the way regionalism affects differently actors at an 
individual level is as much important to understand the genuine meaning of regional and 
national positions (through qualitative work certainly). In this respect, the fact that the national 
parliaments remain central might not necessarily be in contradiction with the regionalism 
hypothesis: national MPs can influence national policy-making in favour of its region, debating 
on further devolution, and are under a process socialization (once they are in office, they build 
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and develop network and specialization that constitute structural advantage in comparison to 
moving to the ‘unknown’ regional political arena). Above all, the prestige and authority of 
historical national parliaments might simply constitute strong social and political 
representations working as incentives for ambitious candidates.  
The debate about the impact of regionalism on career patterns in multi-level systems 
was opened a decade ago. This paper aimed to move it one step further but the analysis of career 
patterns in multi-level systems (with a systematic analysis from local to European levels) 






Table 1. Summary of cases selection 
Strong regionalism Catalonia Flanders Quebec Scotland 
Ethnoregionalist party Strong Strong/medium Strong Strong/medium 
Self-identification R > N R  N R  N R > N 






Ethnoregionalist party  Inexistent Weak Inexistent Weak 
Self-identification N  R N  R N > R R  N 
Ref. on independence No No No No 
      
 





Table 2. Career patterns in cases of strong and weak regionalism 
 Catalonia  Scotland  Quebec  Flanders     
Strong regionalism N %  N %  N %  N %     
Regional career 253 27.9  123 43.8  193 36.6  64 10.6     
National career 96 10.6  71 25.3  103 19.5  137 22.7     
Discrete regional career 327 36.1  48 17.1  141 26.8  89 14.8     
Discrete national career 118 13.0  6 2.1  66 12.5  139 23.1     
Multi-level experience 112 12.4  33 11.7  24 4.6  174 28.9     
All but others 906 100  281 100  527 100  603 100     
Censored career/others  131 -  76 -  119 -   225 -     
All careers 1037 -  357 -  646 -   828 -     




 Wales  Ontario  Wallonia  Brussels  
 N %  N %  N %  N %  N %  
Regional career 59 13.1  54 39.4  187 33.9  37 6.7  85 31.8  
National career 74 16.5  41 29.9  162 29.4  76 13.8  10 3.7  
Discrete regional career 134 29.8  23 16.8  135 24.5  74 13.4  95 35.6  
Discrete national career 120 26.7  2 1.5  52 9.4  64 11.6  13 4.9  
Multi-level experience 62 13.8  17 12.4  15 2.7  128 23.2  64 24.0  
All but others 449 100  137 100  551 100  379 100  267 100  
Censored career/others 44 -  45 -  40 -  149 -  62 -  
All careers 493 -  182 -  591 -  528 -  329 -  













 Wales  Ontario  Wallonia  Brussels 
 Dur. Off.  Dur. Off.  Dur. Off.  Dur. Off.  Dur. Off. 
Regional 
career 
120.4 2.7  136.3 3.0  155.3 4.0  142.8 2.9  163.9 3.4 
National 
career 








35.0 1.2  53.4 1.0  39.97 1.1  37.7 1.3  37.0 1.2 







 Catalonia  Scotland  Quebec  Flanders 
 Dur. Off.  Dur. Off.  Dur. Off.  Dur. Off. 
Regional 
career 
126.5 3.4  129.6 2.9  144.2 4.0  133.4 2.9 
National 
career 












Table 4. Level-hopping movements between strong and weak regionalism 
  Catalonia Quebec Scotland Flanders   
Strong regionalism N % N % N % N %   
Reg→Nat 29 25.7 15 62.5 4 12.1 13 7.5   
Nat→Reg 54 47.8 9 37.5 28 84.8 122 70.1   
Integrated 30 26.5 0 0 1 3.0 39 22.4   
Total 113 100 24 100 33 100 174 100   




Ontario Wales Wallonia Brussels 
Weak regionalism N % N % N % N % N % 
Reg→Nat 32 56.1 12 85.7 5 29.4 16 12.5 11 17.2 
Nat→Reg 16 28.1 1 7.1 11 64.7 79 61.7 19 29.7 
Integrated 9 15.8 1 7.1 1 5.9 33 25.8 34 53.1 
Total 57 100 14 100 17 100 128 100 64 100 
 
 
Table 5. Level-hopping movements between strong and weak regionalism 
(Excluding first regional elections) 
  Catalonia Quebec Scotland Flanders   
Strong regionalism N % N % N % N %   
Reg→Nat 29 25.7 15 62.5 4 33.3 24 22.4   
Nat→Reg 54 47.8 9 37.5 8 66.7 55 51.4   
Integrated 30 26.5 0 0 0 0.0 28 26.2   
Total 113 100 24 100 12 100 107 100   




Ontario Wales Wallonia Brussels 
Weak regionalism N % N % N % N % N % 
Reg→Nat 32 56.1 12 85.7 6 66.7 23 28.0 11 17.7 
Nat→Reg 16 28.1 1 7.1 3 33.3 33 40.2 17 27.4 
Integrated 9 15.8 1 7.1 0 0.0 26 31.7 34 54.8 













Table 6. Regional and national ratios  
Weak regionalism Regional ratio  National ratio  Results 
Castilla-La-Mancha 0.44  0.62  N > R 
Wales 2.35  20.50  N > R 
Ontario 1.39  3.12  N > R 
Wallonia 0.50  1.19  N > R 
Brussels 0.89  0.77  R > N 
Strong regionalism Regional ratio  National ratio  Results 
Catalonia 0.77  0.81  N > R 
Scotland 2.56  11.83  N > R 
Quebec 1.37  1.56  N > R 




Table 7. Regional and national ratios, by political parties 
Ethnoregionalist parties   
Weak regionalism Regional ratio  National ratio  Results  N 
Wales 0.58  All prof.  N > R  31 
Strong regionalism Regional ratio  National ratio  Results  N 
Catalonia 0.94  0.88  R > N  453 
Scotland 2.38  All prof.  N > R  98 
Quebec 1.77  1.44  R > N  258 
Flanders 0.79  0.70  R > N  218 
Other parties   
Weak regionalism Regional ratio  Nat ratio  Results  N 
Wales 2.63  19.00  N > R  151 
Strong regionalism Regional ratio  Nat ratio  Results  N 
Catalonia 0.64  0.79  N > R  584 
Scotland 2.66  11.00  N > R  259 
Quebec 1.13  1.78  N > R  364 
Flanders 0.74  1.13  N > R  442 





Atkinson, M. M., & Docherty, D. C. (1992). Moving Right along: The Roots of Amateurism in 
the Canadian House of Commons. Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue 
canadienne de science politique, 25(2), 295-318.  
Béland, D., & Lecours, A. (2008). Nationalism and Social Policy: The Politics of Territorial 
Solidarity. Don Mills: Oxford University Press. 
Borchert, J. (2011). Individual Ambition and Institutional Opportunity: A Conceptual Approach 
to Political Careers in Multi-level Systems. Regional & Federal Studies, 21(2), 117-
140.  
Borchert, J., & Stolz, K. (2011a). German Political Careers: The State Level as an Arena in its 
Own Right? Regional & Federal Studies, 21(2), 205-222. doi: 
10.1080/13597566.2011.530017 
Borchert, J., & Stolz, K. (2011b). Introduction: Political Careers in Multi-level Systems. 
Regional & Federal Studies, 21(2), 107 - 115.  
Botella, J., & Teruel, J. R. (2010). Hommes d’État ou tribuns territoriaux? Le recrutement des 
présidents des Communautés autonomes en Espagne. Pôle Sud. Revue de science 
politique de l’Europe méridionale, 33(2), 7-25.  
Botella, J., Teruel, J. R., Barbera, O., & Barrio, A. (2010). A new political elite in Western 
Europe? The political careers of regional prime ministers in newly decentralised 
countries. French Politics, 8, 42–61. doi: 10.1057/fp.2009.40 
Burchell, J. (2001). Evolving or conforming? Assessing organisational reform within European 
green parties. West European Politics, 24(3), 113-134. doi: 
10.1080/01402380108425455 
Burgess, M. (2006). Comparative federalism. Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. 
Cameron, D., & Simeon, R. (1997). Ontario in Confederation: The Not-So-Friendly Giant. In 
G. White (Ed.), The Government and Politics of Ontario (5th ed., pp. 158-1985). 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Carty, R. K., Cross, W., & Young, L. (2000). Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics. Vancouver: 
UBC Press. 
Cesare, S., & Xiang, Y. (2012). Software Similarity and Classification. London: Springer. 
Christiansen, T. (1998). Plaid Cymru. Dilemmas and ambiguities of Welsh regional 
nationalism. In L. De Winter & H. Türsan (Eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe 
(pp. 125-142). London and New York: Routledge. 
Comeche-Pérez, J., & Oñate, P. (2012). Political Careers in Spain: Territorial Movements in a 
Multi-Level Political System. Paper presented at the IPSA 22 World Congress of 
Political Science Madrid.  
Curtice, J. (2013). Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years. 
Government Office for Science. Foresight. 
Dardanelli, P. (2007). Federal democracy in Switzerland. In M. Burgess & J. Pinder (Eds.), 
Multinational federations (pp. 142-159). London: Routledge. 
De Winter, L., Gómez-Reino, M., & Lynch, P. (Eds.). (2006). Autonomist Parties in Europe: 
Identity Politics and the Revival of the Territorial Cleavage. Volumes I and II. 
Barcelona: ICPS. 
De Winter, L., & Türsan, H. (1998). Regionalist parties in Western Europe: Routledge. 
Deschouwer, K., & Sinardet, D. (2010). Identiteiten, communautaire standpunten en 
stemgedrag. In K. Deschouwer, P. Delwit, M. Hooghe & S. Walgrave (Eds.), De 
29 
 
stemmen van het volk. Een analyse van het kiesgedrag in Vlaanderen en Wallonië op 7 
juni 2009 (pp. 75-98). Brussel: VUB Press. 
Docherty, D. (2011). The Canadian Political Career Structure: From Stability to Free Agency. 
Regional & Federal Studies, 21(2), 185-203. doi: 10.1080/13597566.2011.530018 
Dodeigne, J. (2014). (Re-)Assessing Career Patterns in Multi-Level Systems: Insights from 
Wallonia in Belgium. Regional & Federal Studies, 24(2), 151-171. doi: 
10.1080/13597566.2013.865605 
Dogan, M., & Pelassy, D. (1990). How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics 
(2nd ed.). Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers. 
Drummond, R. (1987). Is There an Ontario Identity? In E. Mandel & D. Taras (Eds.), A Passion 
for Identity: An Introduction to Canadian Studies (pp. 322-336). Agincourt, ON: 
Methuen. 
Erk, J. (2008). Explaining federalism: state, society and congruence in Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Germany and Switzerland. London: Routledge. 
Fiers, S. (2001). Carrièrepatronen van Belgische parlementsleden in een multi-level omgeving 
(1979-1999). Res Publica, 43, 171-192.  
Fitjar, R. D. (2010). The rise of regionalism: Causes of regional mobilization in Western 
Europe. London: Routledge. 
Frognier, A.-P., De Winter, L., & Baudewyns, P. (2008). Les Wallons et la réforme de l'Etat. 
Une analyse sur  base de l'enquête post-électorale de 2007: Pôle Interuniversitaire 
Opinion Publique et Politique. 
Geddes, B. (1990). How the Cases You Choose Affect  the Answers You Get: Selection  Bias 
in Comparative  Politics. Political Analysis, 2(1), 131-150.  
Henderson, A. (2005). Identity measurement in Scotland and Québec: the meaning and salience 
of identity markers. British Journal of Canadian Studies, 18(2), 269-291. doi: 
10.3828/bjcs.18.2.5 
Hepburn, E. (2010). Small Worlds in Canada and Europe: A Comparison of Regional Party 
Systems in Quebec, Bavaria and Scotland. Regional & Federal Studies, 20(4), 527 - 
544.  
Høyland, B., Sircar, I., & Hix, S. (2009). An Automated Database of the European Parliament. 
European Union Politics, 10(1), 143-152. doi: 10.1177/1465116508099764 
Jones, M. P. (2002). Amateur legislators - professional politicians: The consequences of party 
centered electoral rules in a federal system. American Journal of Political Science, 
46(3), 656-669.  
Keating, M. (1998). The new regionalism in Western Europe. Territorial restructuring and 
political change. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar  
Keating, M., & Wilson, A. (2010). Federalism and Decentralisation in Italy. Paper presented 
at the PSA Conference, Edinburgh.  
Lachapelle, G. (2007). Identités, économie et territoire : la mesure des identités au Québec et la 
Question Moreno. Revue internationale de politique comparée, 14(4), 597-612.  
Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. The American Political 
Science Review, 65(3), 682-693.  
Maddens, B., Beerten, R., & Billiet, J. (1998). In K. Deprez & L. Vos (Eds.), Nationalism in 
Belgium: shifting identities, 1750-1995 (pp. 199-208). London: Macmillan. 
Magone, J. M. (2009). Contemporary Spanish Politics. New York: Routledge. 
Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Schakel, A. H. (2008). Measuring Regional Authority. Regional & 
Federal Studies, 18(2-3), 111-121. doi: 10.1080/13597560801979464 
Martínez-Herrera, E. (2002). From nation-building to building identification with political 
communities: Consequences of political decentralisation in Spain, the Basque Country, 
30 
 
Catalonia and Galicia, 1978–2001. European Journal of Political Research, 41(4), 421-
453. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.00018 
Massetti, E., & Schakel, A. H. (2013). Ideology matters: Why decentralisation has a 
differentiated effect on regionalist parties' fortunes in Western democracies. European 
Journal of Political Research, 52(6), 797-821. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12015 
McGarry, J. (2005). Asymmetrical federalism and the plurinational state Third International 
Conference on Federalism. Federalism: Turning diversity into harmony. Sharing best 
practices. Speeches, contributions and conclusions (pp. 302-324). Tielt: Lannoo. 
Miley, T. J. (2006). Nacionalismo y política lingüística: el caso de Cataluña: Madrid: Centro 
de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionale. 
Moncrief, G. F. (1994). Professionalization and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: 
Comparison to U. S. State Legislatures. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19(1), 33-48.  
Moncrief, G. F. (1998). Terminating the provincial career: Retirement and electoral defeat in 
Canadian provincial legislatures, 1960-1997. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 
31(2), 359-372.  
Moncrief, G. F. (1999). Recruitment and Retention in U. S. Legislatures. Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, 24(2), 173-208.  
Moreno, L. (2001). The federalization of Spain. London: Frank Cass. 
Moreno, L. (2006). Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the 'Moreno Question'  Scottish 
Affairs, 54.  
Moreno, L., Arriba, A., & Serrano, A. (1998). Multiple identities in decentralized Spain: The 
case of Catalonia. Regional & Federal Studies, 8(3), 65-88.  
Patzelt, W. J. (1999). Recruitment and Retention in Western European Parliaments. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 24(2), 239-279.  
Pedersen, M. N. (1979). The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of 
Electoral Volatility. European Journal of Political Research, 7(1), 1-26.  
Pilet, J.-B., Fiers, S., & Steyvers, K. (2007). Des élus multi-niveaux. Carrière politique et 
recrutement des élites en Belgique. In A. Faure, J.-P. Leresche, P. Muller & S. Nahrath 
(Eds.), L’action publique à l’épreuve des changements d’échelle (pp. 309-320). Paris: 
PUF. 
Real-Dato, J., Rodríguez-Teruel, J., & Jerez-Mir, M. (2011). In Search of the ‘Ladder Model’: 
Career Paths of Spanish Diputados (1977-2010) Paper presented at the ECPR General 
Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland.  
Rocher, F. (2002). The Evolving Parameters of Quebec Nationalism. International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies, 4(1), 75-97.  
Rodríguez-Teruel, J. (2011). Ministerial and Parliamentary Elites in Multilevel Spain 1977–
2009 Comparative Sociology, 10, 887-907.  
Samuels, D. (2003). Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Schlesinger, J. A. (1966). Ambition and Politics. Political Careers in the United States. 
Chicago: Rand McNally & Company. 
Squire, P. (1988). Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures. Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, 13(1), 65-82.  
Squire, P. (2014). Electoral Career Movements and the Flow of Political Power in the American 
Federal System. State Politics & Policy Quarterly. doi: 10.1177/1532440013520244 
Stolz, K. (2001). The Political Class and Regional Institution-Building: A Conceptual 
Framework. Regional & Federal Studies, 11(1), 80-100.  
Stolz, K. (2003). Moving up, moving down: Political careers across territorial levels. European 
Journal of Political Research, 42(2), 223-248. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.00081 
31 
 
Stolz, K. (2010). Towards a Regional Political Class? Professional Politicians and Regional 
Institutions in Catalonia and Scotland. Manchester. 
Swenden, W. (2006). Federalism and regionalism in Western Europe: a comparative and 
thematic analysis. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Torcal, M., & Mota, F. (2013). The role of political parties in shaping citizens’ political 
preferences for the territorial organization of the state: the Spanish case. European 
Political Science Review, FirstView, 1-26. doi: doi:10.1017/S1755773913000210 
Toubeau, S., & Massetti, E. (2013). The Party Politics of Territorial Reforms in Europe. West 
European Politics, 36(2), 297-316. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2013.749657 
Van Haute, E., & Pilet, J.-B. (2006). Regionalist parties in Belgium (VU, RW, FDF): Victims 
of their own success? Regional & Federal Studies, 16(3), 297-313.  
Vanlangenakker, I., Maddens, B., & Put, G.-J. (2013). Career Patterns in Multilevel States: An 
Analysis of the Belgian Regions. Regional Studies, 47(3), 356-367. doi: 
10.1080/00343404.2012.753144 
Wiseman, N. (1997). Change in Ontario Politics. In G. White (Ed.), The Government and 
Politics of Ontario (pp. 418-441). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Zuber, C. I. (2011). Understanding the Multinational Game: Toward a Theory of Asymmetrical 
Federalism. Comparative Political Studies, 44(5), 546-571. doi: 
10.1177/0010414010364350 
 
